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  1Abstract 
 
Argentina’s economic collapse in December 2001 is seen as perhaps the most 
emblematic evidence of the failure of neoliberalism in the developing world to provide 
sustainable and equitable economic growth. A new policy frame has gradually emerged 
since the crisis which relies on a more active state in the promotion of growth. This 
article examines the prospects for state-led growth in Argentina in the context of open 
markets. It explores the policies implemented since 2002 and asks to what extent they 
constitute a possible route to stable post-crisis governance.   
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 The Return of the State in Argentina 
 
In the 1990s the market had the last word vis-
à-vis the state. But the crisis brought the state 
back in. As a critical protagonist and as the 
only actor with the extraordinary capacity to 
write new rules of the game and recover the 
command instruments of political economy. 




In December 2001 Argentina experienced the most severe economic crisis in its history 
and political-institutional collapse quickly followed. As well as ending residual notions 
of Argentine exceptionalism (Oxhorn 2002), the crisis was taken to confirm the 
comprehensive failure of neoliberalism to deliver stable and equitable growth. The 
rejection of neoliberalism in Argentina is part of a general loss of faith in neoliberal 
economics in the developing world, a process which is particularly marked in Latin 
America (Panizza 2005). But the route to stable post-neoliberal governance is far from 
clear; currently the most pressing question, for progressive governments and 
development specialists alike is, as Rodrik (2002) has observed, ‘After neoliberalism, 
what?’. In Argentina, the search for post-crisis governance has involved a more dynamic 
role for the state in the pursuit of growth and social stability. This strategy has come to be 
known as the neodesarrollismo, in homage to the desarrollista or nationalist economic 
politics which characterised Latin America after the 1940s (Gerchunoff and Aguirre 
2004; Godio 2004; Ricupero 2004)Our aim in this article is to explore the emergence of 
  3the new policy matrix and to examine what neodesarrollismo means in terms of 
development policy. The new role for the state in Argentina is being carved out in the 
context of a globalised and market-led economy and in the wake of a decade of declining 
living standards for the working class and the poor; we therefore also discuss the range of 
challenges that might threaten the incipient state-led development project, including 
dependence on global markets and foreign investment and the poverty legacy from the 
1990s.    
 
The article is divided into four substantive sections. First, we examine the roots of 
neodesarrollismo in the failures of neoliberalism and in the pendulum switches between 
state and market recipes for development which characterised the political economy of 
Argentina through the twentieth century. In the second section, we explore the gradual 
emergence of the national/neodesarrollista  project after the crisis which erupted in 
December 2001. We then focus on attempts to institutionalise a more dynamic role for 
the state after the election of Nestor Kirchner to the presidency in 2003. The final section 
evaluates the constraints, limits and sustainability of neodesarrollismo.    
 
 States and markets in Argentine development 
 
Argentina’s political economy was shaped by recurrent political and economic crises 
throughout most of the twentieth century. Economically, debate centred on the 
appropriate role of the state and the market in the pursuit of development; politically, 
crises resulted from conflicts between popular organisations and the conservative elite, 
leading to intermittent periods of authoritarian rule and unstable democracy. In the 
contemporary period, the debate was initially settled in favour of economically 
  4nationalist development policies in the 1940s. Peronism (1946-1955) imposed a strategy 
of development that combined a populist model of welfare spending along with state-
sponsored industrialisation, bringing to an end the prevailing period of liberal export-led 
growth (Lewis 2005). As James (1988) shows, Peronism changed the terms of citizenship 
in Argentina by establishing the ‘pueblo’, made up of unionised workers, the urban poor 
and lower middle classes, as a political actor with rights to economic and social 
inclusion. Economically, Peronism was a version of the desarrollista 
(developmentalist/nationalist) school of political economy which was associated between 
the 1940s and 1960s with the Economic Commission of Latin America 
(ECLAC/CEPAL). The ‘Cepalista’ thesis sustained that state control of economic 
resources and arbitration between business and markets would foster ‘national capitalist’ 
growth and reduce external dependency (Prebisch 1949; 1952; Sunkel and Paz 1970). 
Preferential exchange rates for manufacturing, protection of trade, industrial subsidies 
and tariffs were considered important tools for economic growth (Chibber 2004; Lewis 
2005). Import-substitution and the creation of a domestic market for local goods rested 
on assumptions of a bounded sovereign state in which government was able to control 
the nature of its external commitments and to shape the scope and the direction of foreign 
investment.  
 
Nevertheless, as Barbeito and Goldberg (2003) show, Peronism was unable to construct a 
social consensus around the principles of nationalist/statist development and, partly as a 
result, Peron was overthrown in 1955. But, despite the apparent eclipse of Peronism, 
desarrollismo did not lose its appeal. In the first place, the material strength and cultural 
embeddness of working class organisations meant that an economically liberal order 
could not easily be restoration re-imposed. And, secondly, the notion of development 
  5based on national industrialisation had an important constituency of support beyond the 
Peronist coalition. Desarrollismo, this time without Peronism, continued to guide 
government policy under Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962) and Arturo Illia (1963-1966). But 
political instability and the general difficulties attendant on import-substitution in the 
1960s and 1970s generated stop-go cycles of expansion and contraction in which 
inflation and balance of payment crises were controlled by induced recession and 
devaluation, leading to a loss of faith on the part of economic and political elites in state-
led growth, as well as rising social turmoil as unions resisted falls in living standards 
(Fanelli 2003: 42). In effect, the national-based development project of the mid-1940s 
and 1950s had become unsustainable by the 1970s. Protectionism had led to overvalued 
and uncompetitive exchange rates and the economy was dependent on the imports of 
capital and intermediate goods to sustain industrialisation, creating a progressive trade 
deficit (Basualdo 1987). Nationalist industrial policies were increasingly criticised from 
the right for failing to promote competition and for consolidating an inefficient industrial 
structure (Cortes Conde 1997). Growing external indebtedness, meanwhile, contributed 
to the lost decade of the 1980s, characterised by economic collapse, high unemployment 
and a decline in living standards (Haggard and Kaufman 1992).  
 
Democratisation in 1983 thus coincided with economic crisis. The new Radical 
government of Raul Alfonsín opted for a heterodox programme of stabilisation through 
the Plan Austral but failed to institutionalise effective economic governance or reverse 
industrial decline and hyperinflation (Levitsky 2005; Smith 1990). Political instability, 
looting, chaos and economic collapse at the end of the 1980s meant that the 1989 
elections were won by Peronist Carlos Menem. In sharp contradiction to the earlier 
period of Peronist governance in the 1940s, Menem radically – and rapidly – restructured 
  6the economy by taking advantage of unprecedented access to global finance in the early 
1990s. This was made possible inside Argentina by the memory of social and political 
breakdown and economic ‘emergency’ in the 1980s (Palermo and Novaro 1996; Tedesco 
2002). Foreign investment rose from $3.2 billion in 1991 to $11 billion in 1992, and 
$10.7 billion in 1993 (Rock 2002: 65). Public services and utilities were privatised, 
public investments in education, housing and health fell and new controls over the labour 
movement were introduced (Acuña 1995; Murillo 2001). The centrepiece of the new 
liberalism was the Convertibility Plan, introduced in 1991, which tied the peso to parity 
with the dollar. The Plan was instrumental in reducing inflation to less than five per cent 
by 1994 and growth between 1991 and 1995  averaged almost 4.5 per cent a year 
compared to negative figures of previous years (See Ministerio de Economia 2004: 28). 
Macroeconomic stability, meanwhile, alongside easy access to credit, created sufficient 
social support to make the introduction of the reforms feasible.  
 
 
As Rock (2002: 6) and others (Etchemendy 2001; Tomassi 2002) explain, the neoliberal 
reforms under Menem transformed the role of the federal government. Decentralisation 
served as a way to reduce central state spending. The political and social fall-out from the 
massive cuts which followed strained relations with many provincial elites, including 
some Peronist governors, contributed to the erosion of the traditional bonds between the 
poor/working class and Peronism and, ultimately, meant that the endorsement of 
neoliberalism in much of the Peronist Party was largely superficial. While the  on new  
for , was able to jobs,  aloneTpartially  policies butthe ofover the long term ere Central 
government shed its responsibilities for health and education – and 200,000 jobs in the 
process – and the provinces took on a range of extra responsibilities, in particular for 
health, education and welfare. While the social costs of labour restructuring and rising 
  7unemployment were mitigated in the short term by populist redistribution, in the longer 
term, in the context of sustained federal cuts in spending, a steady increase in 
impoverishment and social exclusion and decline in public services was inevitable (see 
tables one and two). In 1980s, it was estimated that 11.5 per cent of Argentine 
households in Greater Buenos Aires, home to over 12 million people or approximately a 
third of the total population of the country, lived below the poverty line. By 1995, this 
figure had risen to 25.8 per cent (Auyero 1999: 51). Almost a third of the total population 
of the country were poor by World Bank standards by 2000, with up to 50 per cent in the 
poorest regions of the country (World Bank 2000). This rapid process of impoverishment 
through the 1990s undermined faith in neoliberalism and unfettered market-led 
development – outside the relatively small group attached to the government – and it is 
key to understanding why the crisis of 2001 led so definitively to a wholesale rejection of 
the policies of the 1990s.  
 
-TABLES ONE AND TWO ABOUT HERE- 
 
The fall of neoliberalism and the rise of a national development project 
 
The economic collapse of 2001 was, in strictly economic terms, a result of the rigidity of 
the Convertibility Plan combined with the fall-out from a fiscal policy which had been 
over-expansionary in the boom years of the early 1990s and which left the government 
few reserves in case of hard times. This became critical after 1995 when the Tequila 
crisis affected investor confidence in emerging markets and meant that the Argentine 
government had no instruments through which to mediate the onset of crisis and the 
problem of capital flight (Rodrik 2004). The growing deficit was financed with 
  8increasing indebtedness (Ocampo 2003: 22-25; Pastor and Wise 2004; Damill et al 
2005). Argentina’s recovery after 1995 was slow and, as a result, the economy was 
unable to withstand the effects of further global and regional turmoil after 1997 in the 
form of the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian crisis of August 1998, and currency 
devaluation in Brazil, Argentina’s main trade partner. The result was a period of 
prolonged and intense recession. 
 
A new centre-left government took office in 1999 in the midst of rising dissatisfaction 
with economic slowdown, the decline of public services and rising poverty, led by 
Fernando De la Rúa of the Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación (Alliance 
for Work, Justice and Education). The Alianza promised reform but, once in office, was 
too weak to resist external and domestic pressures to maintain the fixed exchange rate. In 
an effort to demonstrate his commitment to financial stability, De la Rúa even brought 
back Domingo Cavallo, the ‘father’ of the Convertibility Plan, as Minister of Finance in 
March 2001. Cavallo announced a ‘Zero Deficit Plan’, cutting pensions and public sector 
wages in the order of 13 per cent, and reduced federal transfers to the provinces still 
further. Social protest quickly followed. Piquetero (movements of the unemployed),A () 
uprisings,had first emerged in Salta after the spread quickly across the country and street 
protests erupted to  oppose the planned cuts, proposee re-nationalisation and demand the 
non-payment of the external debt (Svampa and Pereyra 2003; Dinerstein 2003). In 
November 2001, meanwhile, the IMF withdrew its support for the government and, in a 
desperate reaction to stop capital flight, the government imposed restrictions on bank 
withdrawals and money transfers, a policy that became known as the ‘Corralito’. In 
response, the middle classes joined the unemployed and public sector employees in 
seizing public spaces to demonstrate against the government. De la Rúa responded with a 
  9declaration of a state of siege and unleashed a wave of repression which led to over 20 
deaths (Peruzzotti 2001; Manzetti 2002). The slogan of the demonstrations, ‘Que se 
vayan todos’ (‘out with all of them’) gauged the enormous distance which had opened up 
between government and society. It represented a frontal rejection of what was now 
perceived as a self-serving and corrupt governing class and a loss of faith in 
neoliberalism which was blamed for having brought Argentina once more to the brink of 
chaos. Cavallo resigned first, followed quickly by De la Rúa. The country defaulted in 
mid-December and within two months the value of the peso had dropped by more than a 
third and was to fall still further in the coming year. In the face of such extreme 
economic and social chaos, the political order collapsed and presidents came and went in 
quick succession, until a temporary parliament-led government under Peronist Eduardo 
Duhalde assumed some degree of institutional command in January 2002.   
 
-TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE –  
 
The challenges facing the interim government were huge. In addition to the difficulties of 
managing the default and promoting growth, the government faced the real possibility of 
social rebellion. Poverty was rising alarmingly, jumping from 38.3 per cent in October 
2001 to 57.5 per cent a year later (see table three). The number of people living in 
extreme poverty reached 27 per cent in 2002, double the figure (13.6 per cent) of just 
twelve months earlier. Poverty, of course, is not necessarily directly associated with 
social rebellion everywhere; but, in Argentina, where citizenship had been associated 
with a range of social and economic rights since Peronism, the political impact of this 
rapid and abrupt pauperization is hard to exaggerate. It generated a desperate social 
rejection of the political and economic model that had brought the country so low. But it 
  10also created a new phenomenon in Argentine politics – the emergence of a politicised, 
vocal and numerically significant social strata made up of the poor people. Mainly 
composed of suddenly impoverished middle class/upper working classpeople , the new 
poor also encompassed newly unemployed workers who had survived the decline of 
public spending and rising unemployment in the 1990s only to go under in 2001, t 
(Feijoo 2001)hey retained traditions of social organisation:  
 
In 2001, the new poor realised that their social collapse was unstoppable. 
They were going to carry on falling. It was at that point that new political 
actors appeared, representing the new poor….not the historical leaders of 
the working class because, when the labour market collapsed, the unions, 
as the political representatives of the working class, went with it. (Feijoo 
2005: interview with the authors)   
 
The new piquetero movements were not part of the trade union movement, the traditional 
expression for working class and public sector mobilisation, but they were by no means 
hostile to the unions:     
 
Piqueteros  are poor. But they don’t belong to the historical world of 
marginality and structural poverty…..Rather piqueteros  are the 
consequence of the disarticulation of the country's formal wage-earning 
working class. That explains why they are persistent and organised. They 
have historical links with organised socio-economic actors such as trade 
unions. (Godio 2003: online version www.diarioc.com.ar/lanota/10-01-
2004) 
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The revitalisation of trade union activism, meanwhile, on the back of the neoliberal 
collapse meant that the piqueteros were joined by unionists, leading to massive street 
demonstrations, the formation of vocal neighbourhood assemblies and the emergence of 
new sites of social struggle within disused factories. Thousands of barter clubs based on 
non-official ‘currencies’ came into existence and some abandoned factories even went 
into production as cooperatives (Pearson 2003; Petras 2004).  
 
In the face of this kind of social activism, Duhalde sought, above all, to restore traditional 
forms of governance and stability. The new government saw it as imperative to take 
control of the new sources of production and to re-integrate the new social actors into the 
formal channels of state-society networks. With this in mind, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the government rejected orthodox stabilisation programmes which would have 
focused on regaining investor and IMF confidence (see Katz 2006; Powell 2002). 
Instead, Duhalde turned to old ideas and the residual legitimacy of the national 
development project which had been overturned in the 1980 and 1990s and his instinctive 
and tentative policy response has come to be seen as a critical break with neoliberalism. 
In particular, the government set out a new policy based on a pro-active state in some key 
areas of the economy and in the delivery of social services and called for a new alliance 
between state, markets and civil society.  
 
Policies were thus informed by heterodox critiques of neoliberalism which was 
articulated inside Argentina by the movement - which called for re-nationalisation and 
state regulation to foster growth - secondly a broad range of independent economists, 
some of whom were grouped together in the ‘Fenix Group’ from the Universidad de 
  12Buenos Aires (Schorr 2005; www.laeditorialvirtual.com.ar/Pages/UBA_Plan_Fenix.htm. 
1 April 2006), as well as piqueteros and unionists. Whatever differences there may have 
been over the detail of policy, for all these actors industrial reactivation was key to 
recovery. Duhalde also promised the introduction of state-sponsored safety-net welfare 
policies and a renegotiation of the external debt. One of his first - and most symbolic - 
measures was to abandon convertibility and to convert bank deposits and debts into 
pesos. Effectively, this meant devaluation and it was the most dramatic evidence of 
government commitment to domestic industry in more than fifteen years. It generated an 
important ‘bounce back effect’ in terms of exports and, in turn, stimulated the 
productivity of competitive tradable goods. This was accompanied by the introduction of 
a policy of  price controls to encourage consumption and prevent inflation. These 
measures were followed by a 20 per cent tax on export earnings from agricultural 
commodities and hydrocarbons, the income from which was to serve, in part, as the basis 
for emergency social programmes (Gerchunoff and Aguirre 2004). The Corralito was 
lifted in early December 2002. Following hard negotiations, a 70 per cent reduction on 
the debt to private creditors was agreed and an arrangement with the IMF reached for a 
US$3 billion loan in January 2003. The administration was also able to resume payments 
to the World Bank and the IDB, which, in turn, allowed new loans in early 2003 to come 
on stream.   
 
In order to stem the rising tide of contentious politics, the government launched a 
consensus-building initiative, the Mesa de Diálogo, in April 2002, with the support of the 
Catholic Church and the UNDP. Organised in thematic round tables, the Mesa 
encouraged inputs from a broad range of society-based actors including labour, business, 
NGOs,  piqueteros, social movements, political parties and religious groups (Barnes 
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of social inclusion. According to Marcela Masnatta of the UNDP, a founder member:  
 
The most important achievement ….was that we were able to agree….on a 
programme of Citizen Income, which was discussed as a universal right, a 
form of social inclusion. The recommendation from the Mesa was that the 
state should guarantee a minimum income to all citizens. (Masnatta 2005: 
interview with the authors)  
 
The Mesa went on to recommend three specific areas for urgent action: food supplies, 
medicines and the creation of income subsidies for the poorest. These recommendations 
fed into the creation of Programa Jefas y Jefes de Hogares Desempleados (Programme 
for Male and Female Unemployed Households), set up initially with funds from the 
supplemented with World Bank loans after . Significantly, the Jefes y Jefas Programme 
broke the traditional link between welfare, employment and trade unions. It was a 
workfare scheme which offered 150 pesos (US$50) to families in exchange for 
participation in projects such as community service, construction, school maintenance, 
rebuilding health facilities, road works, communal kitchens, house building and even 
more small scale production (World Bank 2002; Ravallion and Galasso 2004; Svampa 
2005). It reflected the fact the casualisation of labour in the 1990s had already created a 
vast pool of low-paid workers ‘organically disconnected from union activities and whose 
interests were not easily articulable with those of wage workers’ (Villarreal 1987: 85 
quoted in Levitsky 2003: 12), to which were added the vast numbers of those suddenly 
without jobs or income. In this context, working class concerns no longer focused only 
on the wages or employment. Jefas y Jefes quickly reached around two million people. In 
  14the process, it became part of traditionally clientelist networks of welfare distribution, 
creating a degree of state control over the unemployed, including the piqueteros 
(Levitsky 2003). Another emergency programme which had its origins in the Mesa de 
Dialogo was the health plan Remediar,  supported by the IDB,  which organised the 
distribution of basic medicines to the poorest social groups. Overall, these policies were 
central in re-establishing the credibility of the state and in bringing about the first signs of 
economic recovery in early 2003.  
 
Neodesarrollismo as a strategy for governance: the K administration 
 
The interim administration gave way to the elected government of Nestor Kirchner, 
Peronist ex-governor of the Province of Santa Cruz, in May 2003. Kirchner, who 
campaigned on a clearly anti-neoliberal programme, was one of two Peronist candidates, 
the other being ex-president Carlos Menem who retained a significant quota of support 
within the party machine.  First round results indicated a split Peronist vote, with 24 per 
cent for Menem and 22 per cent for Kirchner, with the rest of the votes scattered between 
other candidates. Given that no one had received the necessary 45 per cent support to win 
the elections outright, a run-off was scheduled between Menem and Kirchner. But 
Menem pulled out before the second round could take place, leaving Kirchner to become 
president by default and in an apparently weak position. Despite these inauspicious 
beginnings, however, in less than three months Kirchner enjoyed an 80 per cent support 
rating (Pagina/12: 30/12/2003), almost certainly explained by his image as socially-
conscious, socially-responsible politician and his forthright commitment to job creation 
and domestic industry. 
 
  15Committed from the outset to continuing the policies initiated by Duhalde (Gasparini 
2003), Kirchner retained Roberto Lavagna, regarded as the chief architect of the 
economic recovery in 2002-2003, as Minister of the Economy until 2005. Initially on 
conjunction with Lavagna, Kirchner focused policy around rebuilding Argentina’s 
industrial base, public works and public services and, in a clear reversal of Menemismo, 
the state began to take on a role in stimulating economic growth. The government also 
sought to renegotiate the terms under which some foreign companies operate the public 
services privatised in the 1990s. The exchange rate, additionally, has proved a 
particularly critical tool of government policy and taxes have increased on the export 
sector in order to raise revenue. A judicious devaluation of the peso in January 2002, 
meanwhile, led to a considerable expansion of exports (see table four). Export 
performance has also been aided by high prices internationally for exports, especially 
agro-industrial goods, such as soybeans, wheat, and oil. Kirchner’s decision not to pay 
the external debt until the end of 2005 allowed for an accumulation of reserves which 
expanded local confidence in the economy. Inflation has been kept down mainly through 
government-led negotiations with supermarkets and producers for ‘voluntary’ price 
controls, which has meant, in fact, a constant process of monitoring, exhortation and 
warning by government of the danger of pushing prices up. In sum, stability and growth 
since 2003 have been the result of a combination of judicious policy making and 
widespread social fear of the consequences of a return to recession, combined with a 
supportive external environment.  
 
-TABLES FOUR AND FIVE ABOUT HERE- 
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however. Far from re-establishing the link between citizenship and universal welfare 
which characterised desarrollismo, Kirchner has been keen not to promise too much. 
Although he makes extensive use of the traditional symbols and discourse of Peronism 
and desarrollismo – there is an almost constant evocation of the ‘national’, associated 
with consumption, rights, employment etc - welfare spending remains, emphatically, 
targeted at specific social groups. This strategy has been rendered feasible by the fact that 
unemployment has fallen to around ten per cent (see table five). The Jefas y Jefes 
programme inherited from Duhalde, is still the largest single social programme, although 
others have been created such as Familias, which aim at enhance schooling attendance in 
poor households, and Manos a la Obra, which supports the creation of cooperatives and 
workfare initiatives. Most spending of this sort is linked to the government’s need to 
build political support and the decision to try and bring confrontational civil society 
movements into the structures of state-centred governance. In particular, the government 
has sought to disarticulate the piquetero  movement through subsidies and public 
spending in the poor neighbourhoods where piquetero  movements emerged (Godio 
2003). It has been estimated that eight per cent of the population in receipt of Jefas y 
Jefas funds are piqueteros and many more are linked informally or through family and 
neighbourhood networks. The Agrupación Barrios de Pie, a moderate piquetero 
movement, controls sizable programmes of infrastructure and development in poor 
neighbourhoods of Buenos Aires (Godio 2003). One piquetero leader, Luis D’Elia, of the 
Fundación Tierra y Vivienda (FTV) even accepted a ministerial post in government, in 
the Department of Planning. All of this, inevitably, leaves the government open to 
criticism of using welfare spending as a means of buying political support (Lo Vuolo 
2005: interview with the authors).   
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But despite the political utility of targeted welfare spending, Kirchner has spent most of 
the country’s new financial resources paying off international creditors. The government 
has opted not to stage debt payments with the IMF but to clear the account. Argentina’s 
US$9.8 billion debt was settled in December 2005 (Pagina/12: 19/01/2006). The decision 
to seek independence from the IMF in this way owes much to the need to create an image 
inside Argentina of a sovereign state although, clearly, it also creates greater room for 
manoeuvre about policy than was possible in Argentina in the second part of the 1990s. 
Kirchner’s desire to strengthen Argentina’s position vis-à-vis international institutions is 
matched by a policy, again popular domestically, of seeking to remake relations – not 
always successfully, it has to be acknowledged - within Latin America. In contrast to the 
Menem period when the bilateral relationship with the US seemed to be more important 
than relations with the country’s neighbours, Kirchner is pursuing a closer relationship 
with Brazil, Venezuela and Bolivia though MERCOSUR and is committed to the notion 
of a regional energy market. A joint venture, for example, was agreed in April 2005 
between the state-managed ENARSA (Energía Argentina S.A), founded in 2004, and the 
Venezuelan state-owned oil company, PDVSA (Petróleo de Venezuela) (Pagina/12: 
20/01/2006). Clearly, at bottom here is the ambitious goal of achieving greater economic 
independence for South America through a common energy policy. But bringing this 
bold dream to fruition depends upon sustained cooperation and joint investments across 
the region over a long time scale and the current atmosphere of cooperation could easily 
dissolve, as in the past, into conflicts based on national interests, along the lines of the 
gas price dispute with Chile in 2004 and the bitter legal wrangling with Uruguay over 
environmental damage to the Rio de la Plata in 2006.  
 
  18The sustainability of neodesarrollismo 
 
There is no easy yardstick against which to judge Argentina’s performance after 2002 
mainly because there is no clear consensus over what a successful post-neoliberal 
political economy actually looks like. As Helleiner (2003: 686) notes, ‘it is not 
immediately apparent…what is replacing the Washington Consensus’. The appropriate 
mix of state/market incentives; the role of state institutions; the scale of welfare 
spending; the relationship with foreign investors: there is little international agreement 
over any of these core issues. Rodrik (2002) talks of the need to seek national-specific 
solutions in place of the fashion for global models in the 1990s and the trend throughout 
most of Latin America is for a greater degree of economic nationalism than was the case 
in the 1990s.  But nationalism now is cast in a very different mould from the period 
1940s-1960s and state intervention has come to mean less control over the commanding 
heights of the economy and more a combination of ‘selective protectionism and targeted 
state intervention’ and a push for the state to ‘carve out independent courses of action in 
the global economy’ (Helleiner 2003: 689-690). 
 
In this context, it is not surprising that Kirchner’s policies appear, in many respects, ad-
hoc and experimental. Nevertheless, their immediate impact is difficult to dispute. In the 
period since 2003, Argentina has grown at an annual average rate of almost 9 per cent. 
Of course only some of this is due directly to the policy mix introduced after Kirchner 
took office. The recovery was triggered by the de facto devaluation imposed by 
Duhalde’s government in the first quarter of 2002 and the default on the international 
debt. As we argued above, it was also aided by high international commodity prices for 
Argentina’s principal exports including soy and oil, the strong growth of world trade and 
  19a reduction in the volume of imports into the country (Damill et al 2005: 22).   
Nevertheless, it is also the case that the economic recovery, whether attributed to internal 
policies or external demand, has been deployed effectively by the government to reassert 
control and impose afresh the authority of the state. 
  
This new role for the state undoubtedly challenges assumptions about a global trend 
towards policy convergence and the triumph of neoclassic economics based on an 
extreme understanding of globalisation and global markets (Haggard and Maxfield 1996; 
Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Strange 1998). But the internationalisation of the economy 
is nonetheless real and it imposes real policy constraints. In particular, it means that state 
intervention is mainly driven by technical demands for ‘better’ regulation and can only 
be employed selectively within the economy. In turn, this shapes what neodesarrollismo 
and other post-neoliberal projects can mean. In so far as Argentina is concerned, the 
weight and the authority of private and foreign capital on policy making are much greater 
than they were at any point under desarrollismo and there are, as a result, much stricter 
limits on how far government can raise taxes, provide subsidies, regulate privatised 
companies or support labour movements in their struggles to raise wages. There are 
differences too in the social role of the state under neodesarrollismo.  In particular, 
contemporary economic nationalism does not equate citizenship with economic and 
social rights in partnership with the trade union movement. As a result of these 
constraints, neodesarrollismo embodies a series of latent tensions, including a lack of 
clarity about the boundaries of state intervention within the economy and the appropriate 
relationship between the state and foreign capital. How to combine a pro-active state with 
an economy reliant on foreign investment and vulnerable to fluctuations in external 
demands and how to promote a social inclusion agenda in a situation where citizenship 
  20has been separated from concepts of social rights and universal welfare also remain as 
unanswered questions. There are, in other words, serious challenges ahead before 
neodesarrollismo is institutionalised as a stable mode of governance. We identify now 
some of the issues which might, potentially, derail the neodesarrollista project 
 
Employment     
 
Unemployment fell from a high of 19 per cent in 2002 to about 10 per cent by the end of 
2005. But this achievement masked the failure to reverse certain structural changes 
within the labour market. In particular, many new jobs are in non-unionised and low-paid 
settings such as the service sector. Fiszbein, Giovagnoli and Asuriz (2003)’s survey of 
labour market changes during the crisis show that there was a: 
 
deterioration in the ‘quality’ of jobs….in terms of the type of 
employment reported both by those that obtained new jobs (temporary 
more than permanent and…. [without] any type of the standard benefits 
associated with formal sector jobs) and those that changed jobs 
(indicating a net increase in the proportion of temporary jobs and a large 
presence of ‘jobs without benefits’ amongst those that moved to 
permanent positions).  
 
Current government figures point to a phenomenal 47.5 per cent of workers without 
social insurance, a figure which has not changed since 2002 (see Instituto Mundo del 
Trabajo 2005). Not surprisingly, the centre-left opposition to Kirchner has focused its 
critique of the government around its failure to create stable well-paid employment. ARI 
  21for example, has made a point of arguing that workfare programmes legalise or formalise 
precarious employment in informal enterprises or even encourage formally constituted 
companies to take on workers informally (en negro), in order to avoid paying taxes and 
social insurance (Lo Vuolo, 2005).  
 
The fall in the number of unemployed also hides damaging and persistent unemployment 
amongst young people (see table six). Even through domestic manufacturing has 
expanded, many young men, especially if they have never worked, have become 
unemployable within traditional employment settings. This is linked as much to the 
deterioration of the social fabric of working class communities, many of which have 
witnessed new problems of drugs and violence since the 1990s, feeding an exaggerated 
fear on the part of the middle classes of disaffected young men and making it difficult for 
young men to find a place in the formal labour market. Solving this problem demands a 
concerted policy response from government which goes beyond simply job creation; but 
little, so far, is forthcoming. 
   




Argentina’s economic recovery has been accompanied by inflationary pressures that 
might well challenge the long-term sustainability of state-led growth. Inflation reached 
12 per cent at the end of 2005. Kirchner’s approach to resolving inflation has been 
mainly one of fire-fighting – the introduction of ad-hoc policies such as price controls for 
basic goods and services, periodic and sometimes arbitrary controls on exports in an 
  22effort to stabilise prices for goods in the domestic market which experience export-led 
price hiking (such as meat) and government arbitration of wage negotiations.  
 
The government’s difficulty here is linked, at bottom, to the challenging of managing 
business-labour relations, something which has proved almost impossible in Argentina in 
the past. Traditionally, desarrollista policies in Argentina led to wage increases for 
skilled workers but they were ultimately undone by a semi-permanent dispute over 
distribution over domestic income, mainly in the form of wage pressures from labour 
unions and resistance to redistribution of profits by industrialists, leading to intense 
cycles of growth-inflation-recession (see Diaz-Bonilla and Schamis 1999). At present 
wage demands – and profits – are largely contained by government policies and the fear 
of unemployment. Encouraging the trade union movement to defer wage claims in favour 
of steady economic expansion has been a central task of government but Kirchner has 
few instruments to deploy in this task beyond persuasion. In fact, while the power of the 
labour movement was significantly weakened by free market reforms during the 1990s, 
unions have is still some of their authority due to the rise in employment and the 
government’s policy of seeking collective wage agreements. As a result, it will, almost 
certainly, be hard for the government to continue to persuade the trade union movement 
to accept low wages in return for economic stability, especially as fear of recession 
subsides. Yet without it, there is the risk that a damaging inflationary spiral will set in.  
 
A different solution would be for the government to seek to secure a more cooperative 
relationship with business in order to persuade companies to direct some profits towards 
their workers through schemes of corporate responsibility. This would, tacitly, be in 
exchange for the government clearly rejecting the introduction of a comprehensive 
  23programme of taxation on income, fixed assets and profits. Arguments of this sort are 
being made in different ways across the political spectrum in Argentina, as well as by 
academics (Lo Vuolo, 2005). But institutionalising a new pattern of industrial relations, 
based on voluntary codes of social responsibility, will not be easy, given Argentina’s 
traditionally conflictual business-labour culture. Moreover, Kirchner’s strategy of growth 
through domestic industry has changed the relationship between state and business and 
made the government vulnerable to pressures from domestic businesses which, at the 
same time, have less dependence on state subsidies than in the desarrollista period of 
government and are, therefore, less easily reined in. And, whilst it was taken for granted 
in the 1940s-1960s that, in return for the subsidies, industrialists would contribute to 
social insurance schemes for their employees (Chibber 2004), this is far less the case 
today. After years in which local capital was encouraged to bank and spend profit above 
all other considerations, transforming entrepreneurial mentalities now is a hugely 
difficult task. In short, although the government has managed to secure a relatively 
peaceful relationship with business and labour so far, the political economy of 
neodesarrollismo is vulnerable to pressure both from the unions and the employers. If 
either adopt more confrontational attitudes, the government is in a weak position and 




The rise in poverty in Argentina after 1990, and especially in the crisis years of 2001-
2002, was unprecedented. But impoverishment is experienced differentially across the 
social spectrum because of high levels of income inequality, even by Latin American 
standards, prior to the crisis (Fiszbein, Giovagnoli and Aduriz 2002). The dominant 
  24external image of the country in 2001-2002 was of the equalising effects of collapse: the 
newly impoverished middle classes were pictured in the international press engaging in 
barter, alongside the newly unemployed workers organised in soup kitchens and picket 
lines. The middle classes have, however, recovered relatively quickly while some of the 
most badly affected of the working class, who were already part of the long-term 
unemployed before 2001 or were dependent on casual, informal and vulnerable work 
based on family employment, sometimes on the streets or in other precarious locations, 
remain in near destitution. As Rosalia Cortes explains, the impact of the crisis was 
particularly severe for these already-vulnerable groups: 
 
When the crisis began in November 2001, the banks closed and no one 
had cash. The informal sector and those who had lost their jobs in the 
1990s live in a cash economy. They thus had nothing, not enough even to 
eat. That was when the uprisings began but their origins stem from a long 
history of poverty and casual employment….the crisis affected the middle 
classes…but they still had food in the freezer and credit cards….in the 
barrios there wasn’t even food to put in the table once a day….the middle 
class lost their savings but the poor went hungry (Cortes 2005: interview 
with the authors).  
 
These groups have become part of a large and seemingly permanent stratum of poor 
people. The government’s own figures indicate that 33.8 per cent of the population 
remain below the poverty line, of which 12.2 per cent of the population is indigent, that 
is, unable to meet their own basic needs of food, health and housing (see table five, 
above). A further 9.1 per cent of the population lives only just above the poverty line 
  25(with incomes between 745 and 931 Argentine pesos or approximately US$243 and 
US$304). Whilst it is the case that the number of people living in poverty has fallen, the 
figures are far more modest than might have been expected in view of the rate of 
economic growth. Furthermore, poverty, like unemployment, remains higher amongst 
younger people than within the population generally (see table seven), aggravated by 
falling levels of educational achievement during the crisis.  
 
Government policy has largely been to hope that rising employment levels, combined 
with some minimal welfare spending, will solve the problem. Gerchunoff and Aguirre 
(2004: 27), however, argue that growth alone will not solve poverty:  
 
Are we witnessing a new positive connexion between material progress 
and social progress in a new trickle down fashion? It depends on how we 
define things. If by trickle down we understand that economic growth will 
increase sources of employment ….the answer is yes. If more ambitiously 
we understand that this will reduce the gap between rich and poor and that 
will bring a solution to those that lack job qualifications and lag behind in 
the job market, the answer is no.  
 
In view of this – and given the government’s inclusionary language - it is perhaps 
striking how little government attention is focused on the question of embedded poverty. 
Marginalisation and social exclusion on the scale described here almost certainly cannot 
be resolved simply through job creation because many people have become 
unemployable in the new economy and many jobs being created are in the informal 
sector. New forms of imaginative and well-funded welfare and education schemes are 
  26required to repair the social damage created by combined effects of a decade of 
neoliberalism and economic meltdown. Although the government managed a successful 
debt restructuring and payment in full of the debt to the IMF, relatively few new anti-
poverty strategies have been developed. Welfare remains essentially in the safety-net 
model of neoliberalism which can only, at best, ameliorate some of the worst 
manifestations of poverty. The problem for government of course is how to raise 
sufficient income for social spending, especially if further tax increases are effectively 
vetoed. But, if social exclusion and poverty go unaddressed, the scale of deprivation can 




Economically, the success of the whole edifice of neodesarrollismo depends on how 
successfully the government manages the external sector. Neodesarrollismo is an attempt 
to break the myth that state-managed economies are synonymous with close, autarchic 
systems and are inefficient, clumsy and slow to respond to global change. The 
government must show that it can promote an open economy through effective state 
management. But this is far from being an easy task. Certainly, the old desarrollismo will 
not provide answers. While growth, accumulation and distribution were seen as mutually 
supportive and integral elements of the same process of development in the 1940s-1960s, 
managing the export sector and providing for the delivery of social services today are 
regarded as separate, and potentially conflicting, tasks of government.  
 
Neodesarrollismo, is, as Gerchunoff and Aguirre (2004) note, a model of growth that 
rests pre-eminently on a successful export sector. Growth in Argentina has undoubtedly 
  27been fuelled since 2003 by an export boom and strong international demand for 
Argentine agro-industrial products – economic growth has been, in other words, as much 
a matter of circumstances and luck as policy and judgement. The dilemma facing 
Kirchner now is how to manage fiscal and monetary policies in order to sustain the 
Argentina’s export successes, in the context of a globalised economy and historically 
vulnerable commodity prices. At the same time, the government must seek to reduce 
external vulnerability – although it is genuinely hard to know what policies can quickly 
be implemented to do so. Clearly, it is important to generate reserves to offset falls in 
export prices. Nevertheless, if prices fall far enough, even reserves will not be sufficient. 
One way forward is to try and generate a broader range of more exports than Argentina 
presently enjoys. New export goods did emerge in the 1990s, but, compared to Chile for 
example, the range of exports products is still low. Undoubtedly further policies for 
export diversification are required – but these cannot be introduced punitively or 
coercively. In sum, effective management of the export sector remains to a vital task for 




The emergence of a new brand of economic nationalism in Argentina after 2002 marked 
the end of an era shaped by the failure of neoliberalism to provide sustained growth and 
growth-with-equity (Weyland 2004). In a broad sense, it parallels the trend away from 
neoliberalism and other experiences in bringing the state back in elsewhere in Latin 
America. The based on an extreme form of presidentialism crisis of 2001 proved to be a 
turning point from which an alternative project of political and economic governance has 
developed. Neodearrollismo is an ambitious, if sometimes vague and ad-hoc, strategy for 
  28growth, and managing growth, based on macroeconomic prudence, moderate state 
intervention and re-industrialisation. To some extent, it also represents a new strategy of 
social inclusion based economically on a state-led revival of domestic markets and 
politically on a renewal of populist strategies of social conflict management although, in 
the social domain, the revival of the state certainly has very fixed limits.  
 
It is still too early to say whether neodesarrollismo represents a positive example of the 
kind of post-neoliberal ‘experimentation in the institutional and productive sphere’ called 
for by Rodrik (2002) as a response to the end of the hegemony of neoliberal recipes for 
development. It is possible that a new paradigm of stable economic and political 
governance is in the making. Economic recovery has been engineered through a 
combination of export buoyancy, devaluation and stimulation of industry. Social peace, 
meanwhile, seems to have been achieved through populist welfare, ,political inclusion 
and the promise of job creation. Both state-supported export-oriented growth and rapid-
response targeted welfare spending have helped to re-legitimise and re-institutionalise 
government after crisis. But, taking a longer-term perspective, there are difficulties 
ahead. Growth is subject to the logic of the global market and a core task of government 
is to keep foreign investors, as well as domestic business, happy. Redistribution seems 
beyond what the government can even dream of delivering; instead, its central social task 
appears to be to manage the ‘distribution game’ between business and labour and resolve 
conflicts largely to the material satisfaction of business. At the same time as ensuring that 
wage levels do not rise or push up inflation, the government must stimulate exports and 
export-led growth; ensure that the domestic market remains buoyant and local production 
continues to expand production and create employment. This is a tall order for any 
government. In Argentina, it has simply never happened outside the golden years of 
  291946-1952. A certain dose of scepticism about the long-term capacity of the government 
to manage social demands, increase productivity and expand exports is therefore 
inevitable. Between them, Duhalde and Kirchner successfully engineered recovery after 
crisis, re-established governance and reasserted the legitimacy of the state; but, equally, 
Argentina remains a long way from having institutionalised a coherent – and even further 
from an equitable - programme for long term development.   
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Table One 
Poverty, Extreme Poverty and Unemployment in Argentina, 1990- 2001 
 
Year Poverty  Extreme  Poverty  Unemployment 
May 42.7  12.6  9.3  1990 
October 38.1  9.9  6.3 
May 30.1  5.7  6.9  1991 
  October 24.9  4.5  6.0 
May 23.9  4.8  6.9  1992 
October 22.0  4.5  7.0 
May 21.5  4.7  9.9  1993 
October 20.6  5.0  9.3 
May 20.1  4.3  10.7  1994 
October 22.4  4.6  12.2 
May 26.1  6.8  18.4  1995 
October 28.7  7.6  16.6 
May 30.1  8.2  17.1  1996 
October 31.5  9.1  17.3 
May 30.0  7.3  16.1  1997 
October 29.5  7.8  13.7 
May 28.8  7.1  132  1998 
October 30.2  8.5  12.4 
May 31.3  8.9  14.5  1999 
October 30.6  8.3  13.8 
May 33.4  9.0  15.4  2000 
October 32.8  9.6  14.7 
May 35.9  11.6  16.4  2001 
October 38.3  13.6  18.3 
 
Source: INDEC - Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) 
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Table Two  
Changes in Income Distribution in Urban Argentina, 1990-2002 
 





Per capita household income (in 1999 pesos) 
Overall   240.3  292.7   302.8   270.4  294.8   280.6   275.7   253.3   189.7  176.8 
Per capita income by decile 
1
stdecile 
(lowest)   38.3  45.6   43.2   28.1   31.7   30.4   26.3   17.1   9.0   16.1  
5




825.4 1,004.7    1,060.7 992.3 1,114.2 1,028.2 1,041.9    993.8    769.9 705.3 
Relative measures 
Top 20% 
share   50.7  51.0 51.6 53.7  54.8 53.8 55.1 56.8    58.2  57.2   
Bottom 
20% share   4.6  4.5 4.2 3.6  3.5 3.5 3.2 2.6    2.1  2.8   
Gini 
coefficient   0.454 0.456 0.467 0.493 0.504 0.494 0.510 0.530    0.551 0.532 
Top/bottom 
20% ratio   11.0  11.3 12.3 14.9  15.7 15.4 17.2 21.8    27.7  20.4 
 
Sources: World Bank (2003); INDEC, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH), October 
of 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and May and October of 2002.  
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Table Three  
Percentage of Poverty and Extreme Poverty, 2001- 2005 
 
  Year (*)  Poverty  Extreme
 Poverty
May 2001  35.9  11.6 
October 2001  38.3  13.6 
May 2002  53.0  24.8 
October 2002  57.5  27.5 
May 2003  54.7  26.3 
Semester 1, 2003  54.0  27.7 
Semester 2, 2003  47.8  20.5 
Semester 1, 2004  44.3  17.0 
Semester 2, 2004  40.2  15.0 
Semester 1, 2005  38.5  13.6 















Source: INDEC - Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH). (*)INDEC changed its 
methodology in 2003 to reflect changes in socio-economic conditions. The traditional 
method of data collection consisted in permanent households surveys conducted twice a 
year (May and October). Since 2003 it was changed to continuous and quarterly surveys. 
See: ‘Encuesta Permanente de Hogares: Cambios Metodológicos’ (www.indec.gov.ar 
 
 
Table Four  
Evolution of Exports by Sector, 2001- 2005 (in US$ Millions) 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Primary  Products  6,049 5,263 6,460 6,828 7,852 
Agro-industrial 
manufactures 
7,463 8,130 9,991 11,932  12,529 
Industry  8,307 7,603 7,703 9,522 12,474 
Oil and energy   4,791  4,350  5,412  6,171  7,035 
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Table Five  
Incidence of Plan Jefas y Jefes on Poverty, Extreme Poverty and Unemployment 
 
 Poverty  Extreme  Poverty Unemployment
October 2002  57.5   (n/d)  27.5   (n/d)  19.1   (23.6)*  
May 2003  54.7   (55.3)  26.3   (29.7)  15.6   (21.4) 
Semester 2, 2003  47.8   (48.5)  20.5   (23.5)  15.4   (20.5) 
Semester 1, 2004  44.3   (45.3)  17.0   (19.7)  14.6   (19.3) 
Semester 2, 2004  40.2   (40.9)  15.0   (18.2)  12.6   (16.9) 
Semester 1, 2005  38.5   (39.4)  13.6   (15.9)  12.5   (16.1) 
Semester 2, 2005  33.8   (34.6)  12.2   (14.2)   10.1   (14.1) 
 
Source: INDEC - Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH). (*) Denotes the incidence of 




Table Six  
Unemployment Rate for Youth Population Aged 15 and 24 Years Old 
 
Year  1990 1995 2000 2003 2005
Unemployment  (%) 13.0 28.2 31.0 30.9 27.4 






  Poverty and Indigence amongst the Young in 2005 
 
Year   Age: 14-19 Age: 20-24 Total Population
Poverty   54.6%  39.9%  3,528.888 
Indigence 20.7% 14.0%  1,298.315 
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